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Regulation FD and Consumer Inves-
tors: Shedding New Light on Invest-
ment Markets
Jerome Tomas
Information is the lifeblood of our service-oriented
society. In almost every facet of life individuals and
businesses maintain an insatiable desire for the latest,
most accurate information. Access to information in the
securities markets is the most integral component of
success.' Because information is not always equally
disseminated, protective measures are necessary to
protect individual investors from abuses by insiders and
those with privileged information. In addition to promul-
gating new insider trading rules, the SEC has enacted
Regulation FD (for Fair Disclosure) in an attempt to curb
the practice of selective disclosure.
The stated objective of Regulation FD is to address
the common practice of issuers disclosing important non-
public information to securities analysts, institutional
investors, and individual investors, before such informa-
tion is released to the general public.3 Typically, this
material non-public information comes in the form of
advanced earnings forecasts or other significant corpo-
rate developments. This practice allows certain privi-
leged investors to act on this information to their benefit,
whether selling prior to a disappointing earnings an-
nouncement, or buying before favorable information is
released .4
This article will first consider the reasons why a
Regulation banning selective disclosure was necessary.
Second, the article will review the recently enacted
Regulation's pertinent provisions. Finally, it will analyze
the strengths and weaknesses of the Regulation, and
whether, in the author's opinion, it will accomplish the
objectives for which it was enacted.
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I. The Erosion of Investor Confidence and the
SEC's Response
The SEC has long held that the presence of privi-
leged information within the market is detrimental to
investor confidence in the stock market as well as other
investment markets.5 Investor confidence and the integ-
rity of the markets are damaged when certain individuals
are allowed to make a profit just because they were privy
to certain insider information. This effect appears even
more frequent as the markets continue to welcome new
entrants. Accordingly, investors are less confident, and
therefore are less likely to invest in a market when they
know that others with superior information are likely to
succeed not on their own merits, but through a privi-
leged information conduit.7 Clearly, an average investor
without realistic access to this information will be reluc-
tant to invest in a market that he feels has been "rigged
against him."8
Information has value as an asset that can be
turned into financial gain. The SEC was concerned that
management would use material non-public information
as a bargaining chip to obtain favorable reports.9 Without
an obligation to publicly disclose such information,
analysts feel that they must report favorably about a
company or risk losing access to valuable information in
the future." This scenario, if known or suspected by
investors, results in reduced confidence in analysts'
forecasts. Unless an investor has the knowledge and
skills to select "winners" himself, that investor might
choose not at all to invest in the market. These trends,
along with the ever-increasing means of communication
(e.g., internet, telecommunications), prompted the SEC to
promulgate Regulation FD to address the issue of selec-
tive disclosure.
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II. Regulation FD
Despite the well-established principle that the
securities laws seek to promote disclosure of honest and
complete information, there is no general duty to disclose
material information as soon as it arises or is discovered. 11
While a general duty to disclose does not exist, compa-
nies often chose to disclose certain information to se-
lected investors before it is disseminated to the public."
Unless insider trading on the basis of this selectively
disclosed information could be proven, the company and
capitalizing investor went without reprimand. Regula-
tion FD seeks to prevent this.
As adopted, Regulation FD prohibits an issuer (or
any person acting on its behalf) from disclosing material
nonpublic information relating to the issuer or its securi-
ties without making a corresponding public disclosure of
the information.' 3 Disclosure of the information must be
made simultaneously in the event of an intentional dis-
closure or promptly (within 24 hours) if unintentional. 4
The Regulation prohibits an issuer from selectively
disclosing material nonpublic information to anyone who
is "a broker or dealer, or a person associated with a
broker or dealer"; "an investment advisor.., an institu-
tional investment manager.., or a person associated
with either of the foregoing"; "an investment company"
and significantly, to anyone "who is a holder of the
issuer's securities, under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or
sell the issuer's securities on the basis of the informa-
tion."'15
Furthermore, the Regulation prohibits communi-
cations from senior level executives and officers to the
above listed parties. It also relates to any "officer, em-
ployee, or agent of an issuer who regularly communi-
cates" with the parties listed in the immediately preced-
ing paragraph. 16 However, where any "officer, director,
employee, or agent of an issuer.., discloses material
Loyola Consumer Law Review Volume 13, Number 4 2001
nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence to the issuer," that person shall not be consid-
ered to be acting on behalf of the issuer. 7
Regulation FD applies only to issuers that are
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or re-
quired to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange
Act. 8 Importantly, whether or not an issuer makes a
disclosure under Regulation FD, it is still subject to Rule
10b-5 for materially misleading or false statements. 19
It is expected that by 2003, over 20 million online
trading accounts representing approximately three tril-
lion dollars of assets will be in existence. As more aver-
age investors increasingly invest in the securities mar-
kets, a review of the SEC's new rule, while prophylactic
to insider trading, is highly relevant to consumer affairs.
III. Insider Trading v. Selective Disclosure
At first glance, it seems logical that an issuer that
provides analysts with insider information, as well as the
analyst/investor who trades on that information would
subject themselves to insider trading liability. After all,
these individuals or entities are acting on material
nonpublic information, often resulting in large gains by
the investor. The reality of insider trading law, however,
is not as straight forward as common sense might dictate.
In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that a
tippee exposes himself to insider trading liability under
Rule 10b-5 only if the tipper (insider) breached a fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholders of the issuer by obtaining a
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure.2 °
This personal benefit often comes in the form of a
reputational benefit convertible into future earnings or
some other pecuniary gain.21 Thus, the focus of many
insider trading cases shifted away from the nature of the
information, and became concentrated on the duty owed
to the issuer by the tipper.22 The essence of the Dirks
decision is that regardless of the materiality of the infor-
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mation, without a corresponding breach of fiduciary
duty by the tipper, no liability under Rule 10b-5 would
lie. Commenting on the then-proposed Regulation FD,
the SEC noted that after Dirks, few insider trading cases
were instituted involving selective disclosure.23 The
Commission reasoned that while in some instances of
selective disclosure is certainly motivated by the desire
for personal benefit, the requisite desire such benefit is
often elusive and less clear.24 Arguably, the common
perception among corporate insiders soon after Dirks was
that insiders were afforded great latitude in disclosing
corporate information to securities analysts. 25
Regulation FD can be viewed as a regulation that
applies when pecuniary or reputational benefit cannot be
easily ascertained from a particular disclosure. While
issuers are still subject to insider trading liability if the
disclosure amounts to illegal tipping, Regulation FD
provides for an enforcement action without the burden of
having to prove the elements of insider trading.26 An
issuer that violates Regulation FD is subject to a SEC
enforcement action under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act, an administrative action for a cease and
desist order, or civil action seeking injunctive or mon-
etary penalties.27 It is important to emphasize that a
violation of Regulation FD does not give rise to private
liability under Rule 10b-5. 28 Thus, Regulation FD is
supplementary in nature to the insider trading laws.
IV. Methods and Timing of Disclosure Under
Regulation FD
Under the Regulation, an issuer making an inten-
tional disclosure is required to simultaneously disclose
that information to the public.29 If the disclosure is unin-
tentional, the issuer must publicly disclose the informa-
tion promptly.30 Prompt disclosure requires that disclo-
sure be made by the later of 24 hours after the initial
disclosure, or the commencement of the next trading day
on the New York Stock Exchange.3'
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Not all intentional or inadvertent disclosures of
material nonpublic information are covered by Regula-
tion FD. For a communication to come within the scope
of Regulation FD, it must be made by an issuer (or some-
one on its behalf) to a broker, or a person associated with
a broker or dealer, an investment advisor, an institutional
investment advisor, or a holder of the issuer's securities,
who under the circumstances is likely to purchase or sell
such securities based upon such information.32
Public disclosure within the scheme of Regulation
FD may take two forms. First, an issuer may satisfy its
disclosure obligation by filing a Form 8-K with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission sufficiently disclosing
the information.33 Second, Regulation FD permits an
issuer to disclose by any means of disclosure that is
"reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary
distribution of the information to the public." 34 Regula-
tion FD is silent on satisfactory alternate methods of
disclosure.
However, in the Proposed Rule Release, the Com-
mission suggested several methods. These methods
include a press release carried through a widely circu-
lated news or wire service, an announcement at a news
conference to which the public is allowed access, a post-
ing on the issuer's website, as well as other means pro-
vided by technological innovation.35 Referring particu-
larly to disclosure via website posting, the Commission
stated that as not all investors have access to the internet,
disclosure by this means, without any other form, would
be insufficient.36.
V. Materiality Requirement
The Regulation does not provide a definition of
what constitutes material nonpublic information. Instead,
in its Adopting Release, the SEC stated that it was relying
on existing definitions of "materiality" established in case
law.37 Per the Adopting Release, materiality under Regu-
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lation FD will be governed by the same standard as
materiality under 10b-5.38 Under this standard, informa-
tion is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
making an investment decision."3 9 While materiality is
generally an issue of fact, the SEC deems certain informa-
tion such as earnings information, mergers, acquisitions,
new products or discoveries, changes in management,
and events affecting the issuer's securities, as likely to be
material. °
VI. Public Reaction to Regulation FD
A. Investor Opinions
Generally, investors appear to be in favor of the
new regulation.41 While the regulation was still in the
proposal stage, the SEC invited the public to comment on
the wisdom and breadth of the proposed regulation
ending selective disclosure. Comments ranged from
"Please level the playing field," and "I favor Regulation
FD," to "It is very aggravating to see a stock price [fluctu-
ate] for weeks before news of some development regard-
ing the stock becomes available to the average investor."42
Likewise, the regulation makes sense from a
public policy standpoint. A promise that insiders will no
longer be trading on the basis of material nonpublic
corporate information inures public trust in the market.
Arguably, without this trust, the stock market never
would have reached the heights it has over these past
two years. In a society where over one-half of all adults
own stock directly or indirectly, fair opportunity and
access must be the goal.43
B. Corporate Response
One of the harshest criticisms of Regulation FD is
that while its intent is to broadly disseminate investment
information, in practice it would have the opposite effect
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of chilling the amount of information that an issuer is
willing to disclose. Opponents of the new rule argue that
the reduced level of information, in effect, keeps every-
one ignorant of corporate developments, and is detri-
mental to the investment markets.44
While the Commission considered this argument,
it was determined that the Final Regulation had been
"modified" to prevent such an effect.45 In essence, the
Regulation distinguishes between selective disclosure to
certain privileged individuals, and that made in the
ordinary course of business to insiders or fiduciaries
(lawyers, accountants, and other fiduciaries). Thus,
issuers may convey material nonpublic information to its
lawyers or accountants, or others who agree to maintain
the confidentiality of the information, in the conduct of
its normal operations.'
Already, corporations are taking note of the new disclo-
sure requirements and adjusting their analyst discussions
accordingly. Securities lawyers are urging corporations
looking for methods to limit potential liability under
Regulation FD to take certain steps. Such steps include
managing what individuals are permitted to discuss
matters with analysts, investors, and the media; replacing
one-on-one conferences with publicly accessible meetings
(including refraining from the selective distribution of
interim progress reports stating that earnings are on par
with projections); and scripting of analyst conferences, so
as to preempt any inadvertent disclosure of material
information.47
Additional recommendations include blocking
access to issuer information during the period the com-
pany is compiling its quarterly results, and careful scru-
tiny of forward looking statements."' Furthermore, com-
panies that used to conduct one-on-one meetings in order
to provide earnings information are now canceling, or
greatly scaling back the scope of information disclosed in
such meeting, and instead disclosing such information on
a public scale.49
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VII. Regulation FD Benefits Consumer
Investors
The practice of selective disclosure damages a
typical investor's confidence in investment markets.
Where a consumer investor deems the markets unfairly
balanced against him, he will be less likely to invest his
money in that particular market. This poses problems for
both individual investors and the welfare of investment
markets. Investors are confronted with a choice: invest in
a market when you only have partial information, and
hope you win (or hope you don't lose), or place your
money in more conservative investments such as savings
accounts, government bonds, certificates of deposits, and
accept relatively lower yields. In commenting upon the
proposed Regulation FD, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange noted that selective disclosure results in "un-
usual trading, increased volatility" which is detrimental
to the markets.50
Consumers deciding between these investment
mediums might choose to pursue the lower yielding,
conservative route, rather than invest in a securities
market subject to the practice of selective disclosure. The
result of the average investor retracting from the securi-
ties market would be detrimental to the American
economy. Not only would companies suffer from a lack
of available funding, but there would also be less market
liquidity.
Regulation FD also seeks to inform all investors
with equal information, and let skill and diligence, not
superior access to information, dictate who the winners
will be.51 While Regulation FD does not mandate disclo-
sure, it does require that once information is disclosed, it
be disclosed to everyone. For example, Regulation FD
alone does not remedy a situation where an investor
purchases stock for $50/share and the next day, the price
goes down to $45/share. As long as the issuer or its
agents have not selectively disclosed earnings informa-
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tion to analysts, Regulation FD is not implicated. This
makes sense assuming that every investor had access to
the same information at the same time.52
However, where an issuer has disclosed to certain
analysts or institutional investors that it is expecting
lower than previously expected earnings, it must disclose
that information publicly, or it will be liable under Regu-
lation FD. While this Regulation does not address any
perceived harm incurred by an investor due to selective
disclosure, vigorous enforcement will go a long way in
ensuring that investors' decisions are made in light of all
available corporate information. This disclosure will in
turn make consumer investors more secure in the wis-
dom of their investment decisions.
Open, non-selective disclosure also encourages
open and honest analyst opinions regarding a particular
security. In promulgating Regulation FD, the SEC sought
to prevent perceived favoritism in the investment com-
munity. Securities analysts need not fear that the conse-
quences of their open and honest, albeit unfavorable,
opinion will be the withholding of material earnings or
other vital information in the future. Consumers benefit
in that they will now have access to a presumably more
honest assessment of a stock's value and potential. Inves-
tors browsing various investment sites on the internet, or
reading analysts opinions, will be somewhat more certain
that they are receiving a complete and accurate assess-
ment than they would have before the regulation was
enacted.
The Regulation as adopted is fair to consumer
investors' interests, while still allowing an issuer to
discuss confidential information with certain persons.
There is no benefit to the market as a whole derived from
allowing issuers to disclose information selectively to
certain investors while withholding it from others. The
premise of the "chilling effect" argument is that certain
issuers would chose to withhold material information
from all investors for fear of liability under Regulation
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FD. This position however, misses the point in that the
Regulation does not govern or mandate voluntary disclo-
sure. Under Regulation FD, an issuer remains free to
disclose whatever material information they chose, so
long as it makes a simultaneous public disclosure. Under
Regulation FD, liability would exist only where the issuer
chooses to disclose earnings information, or the like, to
analysts or other covered investors before making the
information available to the public.
Recently, the Wall Street Journal published an
article discussing the public announcement of disap-
pointing earnings projections by Intel. 3 News of the
disappointing earnings estimates sent the value of Intel
stock plunging 22% in one day of trading.54 The article
noted that though Intel has historically made a practice
of simultaneous public disclosure, the then-proposed
Regulation was already sending tremors through the
market, causing companies to publicly disclose negative
information.55 Noting the volatility in the one day trading
price of Intel stock, it was stated that while "bad news
generally drives down a stock price... the market im-
pact is more diffuse when filtered out through
analysts."56 Another article in The Wall Street Journal,
discussing the dramatic decline in the NASDAQ index,
while attributing cause to the slowing economy, also
expressed an opinion that Regulation FD will exacerbate
the effect by "blurting this information out, instead of
waiting things out."57 Once again, some argue that the
volatility caused by sudden announcements causes such
drastic declines in the market index.58
Where positive corporate information is involved,
an issuer has a strong interest in publicly disclosing such
information. Once this information is disclosed to the
investing public, market forces will increase the value of
the stock, and thus the value of the issuer. Companies as
well as their directors and officers, concerned with earn-
ings information and the effect such information has on
the stock market price will arguably be more than forth-
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coming with favorable information. In most instances,
the information disclosed under the regulation would be
that which the issuer would ultimately disclose to the
public anyway.59 The regulation does not require the
issuer to make any more disclosure than it otherwise
would have, but simply requires simultaneous public
disclosure if the issuer wishes to make a certain state-
ment to an analyst.
The same can not be said, however, about negative
issuer information. Regulation FD will not have any
chilling effect on the release of negative corporate infor-
mation. It is here, that Regulation FD acts as the defender
of the individual investor. Where an issuer chooses to
selectively disclose material information to particular
analysts or security holders, aside from the potential for
insider trading liability, it generally does so with ulterior
motives. In an earnings-sensitive market, such informa-
tion is harmful to a stock's value and would probably
only be publicly disclosed in anticipation of a legal re-
quirement to disseminate such information. 0 In the
absence of Regulation FD, issuers and their agents are
able to treat the negative earnings information as an
asset, disclosing it to particular analysts, gaining favor
with the investor with a view toward continued favor-
able analyst opinions in the future. 61 The effect of this
quid pro quo is that analysts or investors privy to the
information will be able to act before the rest of the
market, enabling them to either liquidate or establish
positions in a particular security at a reduced cost.
In its Proposed Rule Release, the SEC noted that
analysts and institutional investors privy to this material
non-public information often immediately use the infor-
mation to trade certain securities.62 This informational
advantage gained by conference calls or one-on-one
meeting is used by these parties in making trades with
other less informed investors.63 As a result, parties in
possession of the material nonpublic information are able
to purchase securities at a discount relative to the ex-
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pected market price after the information is publicly
disclosed. The regulation requires that investors from this
point must rely on their own diligence and acumen, not
on superior access to information, in order to make
accurate decisions. Without imposing uniform disclosure
obligations on issuers, unsuspecting investors will be at
the mercy of those in possession of material nonpublic
information. In wake of the uncertainty of whether such
investors will be deemed an illegal tippee under Dirks,
Regulation FD is necessary to protect the average inves-
tor as well as the integrity of the equity markets.
Opponents of the Regulation maintain that initial
disclosure to analysts or other market professionals
prevents market volatility. In essence, this argument goes
as follows: analysts will use the information to gradually
move the market in the direction the information dic-
tates, and that this slow, steady price adjustment of a
particular stock is preferable to sudden, sharp price
increases and decreases. While this position contains
merit, it does not adequately protect the average
investor's interests. Negative information, whether
disclosed slowly or suddenly, has the effect bringing a
stock's price down. However, in a market where selective
disclosure is permitted, those in possession of the infor-
mation are able to take advantage of those investors not
in possession of the information. Fairness dictates that
certain analysts and privileged investors should not be
allowed to jump from the sinking ship, while ordinary
investors are left to sink to the bottom with that ship.
Containing market volatility by permitting selective
disclosure to analysts, who are believed to bring the
market down gently, sacrifices the well being of some
investors in order to effectuate a soft landing. In a society
where more and more financial planning involves the
ownership of stock, such an argument must be viewed
with skepticism.
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VIII. Conclusion
While Regulation FD is an important step in
placing the individual investor on a level playing field
with other larger and privileged investors, it is by no
means an assurance that all investors will have access to
the same information at the same time. It is important to
keep in mind that the regulation does not cover selective
disclosure of non-material information. The Regulation
permits analysts to assemble several individual pieces of
non-material information into material information.' 4
Furthermore, information whose significance is dis-
cerned by the analyst will not come within the purview
of the regulation.65 Thus, the regulation prevents disclo-
sure of material information all at once, but does not
prohibit a trickle of selectively disclosed, non-material
information, that when assembled by an analyst or so-
phisticated investor, becomes material. Uncovering and
assembling useful information through hard work is
consistent with a capitalist society.
The prologue to Proposed Regulation FD states
that "all investors should have access to an issuer's
material disclosures at the same time."66 While in theory,
the regulation has the effect of making public all material
information once it has been disclosed selectively by an
issuer, in practice there is a potential deficiency. While
information must be disclosed simultaneously, the deliv-
ery to investors, in many circumstances, it is at best
constructive. For instance, if an issuer makes a disclosure
in an 8-K, it has abided by the duty imposed under
Regulation FD. Presumably, it is free then to stress this
information to certain analysts and individual investors,
while not making the information known to others. Thus,
investors with greater means, whether by insider status
or persistence, might possibly be able to gain access to
this "publicly available" information first. Thus, for the
growing legions of do-it-yourself on-line investors, ca-
veat emptor is still the game. If disclosure of material
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information is seen as a gift delivered by Regulation FD,
consumer investors must be able to follow the instruc-
tions, as they can no longer claim that they lost due to the
market being rigged against them.
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